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A Court’s Continuing Obligation to  
Ensure Fairness of  
Class Action Settlements 
FILIP GRZELAK* 
In April 2010, Deepwater Horizon, a BP-operated drill-
ing rig, exploded killing eleven workers and poisoning the 
waters of the Gulf of Mexico with 210 million gallons of oil. 
Some 90,000 cleanup workers become involved in the re-
sponse; many became sick after exposure to crude oil and 
Corexit, a chemical used to disperse the oil. A class action 
against BP ensued. A settlement was reached in 2013 and 
provided for a two-phased compensation mechanism, which 
class action experts praised for effectiveness and fairness.  
Soon, however, it became clear that the settlement was 
neither effective nor fair. Many cleanup workers were de-
nied the compensation that they were promised under the 
administrative-based phase one of the settlement. Instead, 
they were forced into the ongoing litigation-based phase 
two, where their individual claims must be brought to federal 
courts. Plaintiffs have become stuck with an unfair settle-
ment and federal courts could be bogged down with a multi-
tude of personal injury trials—an unwanted result of any 
class action settlement. This Comment argues that after 
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granting a judicial approval of a class action settlement un-
der Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e)(2), courts should 
have a continuing duty as a fiduciary to the class to ensure 
fairness and effectiveness of the settlement.  
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INTRODUCTION 
“It is one of the fairest and most impressive settle-
ments I have seen in more than 20 years of practic-
ing, teaching and writing in the field of class ac-
tions.”1  
“This settlement is an extraordinary achievement 
that realizes the great objectives behind court super-
vised class settlement.”2  
“This Court . . . , class counsel, and counsel for BP 
deserve high praise for producing this historic settle-
ment, one that provides meaningful and substantial 
benefits to the class.”3  
These were the statements that Dean Robert Klonoff and Profes-
sor Samuel Issacharoff, prominent practitioners and scholars in the 
area of class action lawsuits,4 made about the Deepwater Horizon 
Medical Settlement Agreement (“MSA”).5 Judge Carl J. Barbier of 
the Eastern District of Louisiana approved this settlement in In re 
Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon” in the Gulf of Mexico 
                                                                                                                                        
 1  Transcript of Final Fairness Hearing Proceedings at 183, In re Oil Spill by 
the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon” in the Gulf of Mex. on April 20, 2010, 295 
F.R.D. 112 (E.D. La. 2013) (MDL No. 2179), Doc. No. 7892 [hereinafter Fairness 
Hearing].  
 2  Declaration of Samuel Issacharoff Relating to the Proposed Medical Ben-
efits Class Settlement at 15, In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon” 
in the Gulf of Mex. on April 20, 2010, 295 F.R.D. 112 (E.D. La. 2013) (MDL No. 
2179), Doc. No. 7116-2 [hereinafter Issacharoff Declaration]. 
 3  Expert Report of Robert H. Klonoff Relating to the Proposed Medical Ben-
efits Class Settlement at 63, In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon” 
in the Gulf of Mex. on April 20, 2010, 295 F.R.D. 112 (E.D. La. 2013) (MDL No. 
2179), Doc. No. 7116-2. 
 4  Id. at 1–4; Issacharoff Declaration, supra note 2, at 2–3. 
 5  Deepwater Horizon Medical Benefits Class Action Settlement Agreement 
as Amended May 1, 2012, In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon” in 
the Gulf of Mex. on April 20, 2010, 295 F.R.D. 112 (E.D. La. 2013) (MDL No. 
2179), Doc. No. 6427-1 [hereinafter MSA]. 
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on April 20, 2010.6 
With the help of legal experts, the MSA was carefully drafted to 
compensate cleanup workers and coastal zone residents who suf-
fered from crude oil and other chemical exposure during the cleanup 
efforts following the disastrous 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil spill in 
the Gulf of Mexico.7 The oil spill not only devastated the fishing, 
shrimping, and tourist industry of the coastal areas of Texas, Loui-
siana, Mississippi, Alabama, and Florida (suffering businesses were 
later compensated under a separate settlement),8 but it also devas-
tated the lives of tens of thousands of cleanup workers and local res-
idents, 9  who suffered either acute (short-term) or chronic (long-
term) medical conditions—mostly related to the skin, eyes, throat, 
sinuses, and lungs—after the chemical exposure.10  
 Despite the enthusiastic statements that were made at the time 
the settlement was being approved, the implementation of the MSA 
did not work as intended. Despite British Petroleum’s (“BP”) public 
promises to take responsibility for both the oil spill and its conse-
quences, as of November 2018, merely 22,836 out of 37,225 claim-
ants were awarded $67.2 million in compensation. 11  The paid 
                                                                                                                                        
 6  In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon” in the Gulf of Mex. on 
April 20, 2010, 295 F.R.D. 112 (E.D. La. 2013) [hereinafter Final Approval of the 
Deepwater Horizon MSA]. 
 7  See MSA, supra note 5, § I; Final Approval of the Deepwater Horizon 
MSA, 295 F.R.D. at 117–18, 149–50.  
 8  Deepwater Horizon Economic and Property Damages Settlement Agree-
ment as Amended on May 2, 2012 at 1–5, In re Deepwater Horizon, 739 F.3d 790 
(5th Cir. 2014) (No. 13-30095).  
 9  On July 8, 2010, approximately 47,000 cleanup workers were deployed. 
Jeremy Repanich, The Deepwater Horizon Spill by the Numbers, POPULAR ME-
CHANICS (Aug. 10, 2010), http://www.popularmechanics.com/science/en-
ergy/a6032/bp-oil-spill-statistics/. However, because of high rotation and replace-
ment rates, the overall number of workers who were employed during the cleanup 
operations was significantly higher. Cf. Final Approval of the Deepwater Horizon 
MSA, 295 F.R.D. at 117 (stating that “[a]s many as 90,000 response workers en-
gaged in near-shore and offshore Response Activities in the Gulf of Mex-
ico . . . .”). 
 10  See Specified Physical Conditions Matrix at 6–9, Final Approval of the 
Deepwater Horizon MSA, 295 F.R.D. 112 (E.D. La. 2013) (MDL No. 2179), Doc. 
No. 6427-10 [hereinafter Matrix].  
 11  Status Report from the Deepwater Horizon Medical Benefits Settlement 
Claims Administrator at 4, 9, Final Approval of the Deepwater Horizon MSA, 295 
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amount is grossly inadequate to the scale of the 2010 Gulf Spill, 
especially considering that both economic and medical claims were 
to be paid out of a $20 billion escrow account that BP set up during 
the spill.12 Further, the paid amount is inadequate considering that 
the law firms representing the plaintiffs in the Plaintiff Steering 
Committee that negotiated the MSA received $680 million in legal 
fees.13 Looking at the MSA over six years after the court approved 
the settlement, it appears that this inadequate payment has left thou-
sands of class members undercompensated or uncompensated, 
which threatens the federal courts with additional and unnecessary 
litigation due to the back-end litigation option in the MSA.”14  
 Thus, even the best designed class action settlement—or at least 
one highly praised by the legal community—may not guarantee eq-
uitable results. Unfortunately, even if a court that approved a class 
action settlement notices that the settlement does not work as in-
tended, it has no power to reevaluate the agreement.15 Under Rule 
23(e)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “the court may ap-
prove [the proposed class action settlement] only after a hearing and 
on finding that [the settlement] is fair, reasonable, and adequate.”16 
Once the settlement is approved, the court has no continuing duty to 
                                                                                                                                        
F.D.R. 112 (E.D. La. 2013) (MDL No. 2179) [hereinafter November 2018 Status 
Report]; CNN Wire Staff, BP Apology Campaign Begins Airing, CNN (June 3, 
2010, 10:05 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2010/US/06/02/oil.spill.bp.apology/in-
dex.html. It is estimated that around 200,000 people—cleanup workers and 
coastal residents—could belong to the class. Fairness Hearing, supra note 1, at 
193.  
 12  Steven Mufson, BP, Plaintiffs Reach Gulf of Mexico Oil Spill Settlement, 
WASH. POST (Mar. 3, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/econ-
omy/bp-plaintiffs-reach-gulf-of-mexico-oil-spill-settlement/2012/03/02/gIQAL9 
OwnR_story.html?utm_term=.9645558d5b8e. 
 13  Katherine Sayre, BP Oil Spill: Two Louisiana Law Firms to Receive $87 
Million Each in Attorney Fees, NOLA.COM (Apr. 13, 2017), http://www.nola.com/ 
business/index.ssf/2017/04/bp_lawyer_fees.html. In comparison to the MSA, the 
economic and property damages settlement, as of April 2019, has paid over $11 
billion. DEEPWATER HORIZON CLAIMS CTR., PUBLIC STATISTICS FOR THE DEEP-
WATER HORIZON ECONOMIC AND PROPERTY DAMAGES SETTLEMENT 3 (2019), 
http://www.deepwaterhorizoneconomicsettlement.com/docs /statistics.pdf.  
 14  MSA, supra note 5, § VIII. 
 15  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2). 
 16  Id. 
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reassess the fairness of the settlement over time even if the settle-
ment proves to be unfair, unreasonable, and inadequate.17 
 This Comment uses the MSA as an example of why the Judicial 
Conference of the United States should consider amending Rule 
23(e)(2) to allow courts to reassess the settlement when justice so 
requires.18 Part I of the Comment will provide a brief overview of 
how U.S. circuit courts interpret Rule 23(e)(2) and how the rule was 
modified in 2018. Also, it will discuss the court’s duty as a fiduciary 
to the class. Part II will shed light on the Deepwater Horizon MSA, 
especially on the mechanism of compensation designed under the 
Matrix-based phase one and the litigation-based phase two. Part III 
will provide the analysis of how and where the MSA failed to pro-
vide fair, reasonable, and adequate solutions to the dispute between 
BP and the class members. The purpose of this Part is not simply to 
point out errors, which in hindsight may be an easy task, but to show 
that even a seemingly carefully crafted class action settlement might 
fail to accomplish its goals. Part III will also show that some changes 
to Rule 23(e)(2)—to allow courts to reassess the settlement after the 
judicial approval—could be a practical remedy to prevent similar 
mistakes in implementing future class action settlements. Part IV 
will conclude with final thoughts on why the courts should be able 
to reassess class action settlements after granting initial approval. 
I. COURTS’ INTERPRETATION OF RULE 23(E)(2) 
A. Circuit Courts’ Factors 
Over the years, circuit courts have developed different tests in-
terpreting the meaning of “fair, reasonable, and adequate” in regards 
to settlements of class actions lawsuits.19 The Fifth Circuit, where 
the settlement in Deepwater Horizon was approved, uses the Reed 
factors.20 These include  
                                                                                                                                        
 17  See id. 
 18  The Judicial Conference of the United States is empowered to create and 
revise the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure pursuant to the Rules Enabling Act. 
28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2012).  
 19  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2). 
 20  Reed v. Gen. Motors Corp., 703 F.2d 170, 172 (5th Cir. 1983). 
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(1) the existence of fraud or collusion behind the set-
tlement; (2) the complexity, expense, and likely du-
ration of the litigation; (3) the stage of the proceed-
ings and the amount of discovery completed; (4) the 
probability of plaintiffs' success on the merits; (5) the 
range of possible recovery; and (6) the opinions of 
the class counsel, class representatives, and absent 
class members.21  
Other federal circuits use similar factors. For example, the Eleventh 
Circuit uses the Bennet factors, which include  
(1) the likelihood of success at trial; (2) the range of 
possible recovery; (3) the point on or below the range 
of possible recovery at which a settlement is fair, ad-
equate and reasonable; (4) the complexity, expense 
and duration of litigation; (5) the substance and 
amount of opposition to the settlement; and (6) the 
stage of proceedings at which the settlement was 
achieved.22  
The 2018 amendment to Rule 23(e)(2) of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure drafted by the Committee on Rules of Practice and 
Procedure added four baseline factors that courts must consider in 
assessing the fairness, reasonableness, and adequacy of a class ac-
tion settlement.23 These factors include “[1] the class representatives 
and class counsel have adequately represented the class; [2] the pro-
posal was negotiated at arm's length; [3] the relief provided for the 
class is adequate (taking into account four subfactors); and ([4] the 
proposal treats class members equitably relative to each other.”24  
                                                                                                                                        
 21  Id. 
 22  Bennett v. Behring Corp., 737 F.2d 982, 986 (11th Cir. 1984). 
 23  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2); Memorandum from Hon. John D. Bates, Chair, 
Advisory Comm. on Civil Rules to Hon. David G. Campbell, Chair, Comm. on 
Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the U.S. 18–19 
(May 18, 2017), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/2017-06-standing-
agenda_book_0.pdf (starting at page 415) [hereinafter Advisory Committee 
Memorandum]. 
 24  Advisory Committee Memorandum, supra note 23, at 18–19. 
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Even after considering these factors and concluding that the set-
tlement is “fair, reasonable, and adequate,”25 it is possible that the 
court may be making a mistake by approving the proposed settle-
ment. For example, even though the court may approve a settlement 
agreement in good faith, the circumstances surrounding the imple-
mentation of the settlement may change or simply be different from 
what was expected.26 Another possibility is that the court, experts, 
or the parties may make an honest error in misevaluating the mone-
tary value and fairness of the settlement.27 Also, it is possible that—
despite the court’s best efforts to detect any wrongdoing—the set-
tlement might be a result of fraudulent collusion between the plain-
tiffs’ attorneys and defendants.28 Under the current language of Rule 
23(e), the court has no practical instrument to rectify its mistake of 
approving an unfair, unreasonable, or inadequate settlement.29 
B. Court’s Duty as a Fiduciary  
There are two theories on the role of courts in approving class 
action settlements. One theory recognizes “that a class action settle-
ment is a private contract negotiated between the parties” and that 
“Rule 23(e) requires the court to intrude on that private consensual 
agreement merely to ensure that the agreement is not the product of 
fraud or collusion and that, taken as a whole, it is fair, adequate, and 
reasonable to all concerned.”30 Thus, this view argues that the role 
of the court is limited and—absent fraud or collusion—the court 
must approve the settlement as long as it finds it sufficiently fair, 
adequate, and reasonable.31 Under this view, in contemplating the 
Rule 23(e)(2) requirements, courts are “[not to] focus on individual 
                                                                                                                                        
 25  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2). 
 26  See infra Section III.C. 
 27  See, e.g., Courtney v. Andersen, 264 F. App’x 426, 430 (5th Cir. 2008) 
(finding that class members “bore the risk of mistake” in a settlement and were 
bound by even reasonable mistakes). 
 28  On the dangers of possible collusion, see  2 JOSEPH M. MCLAUGHLIN,  
MCLAUGHLIN ON CLASS ACTIONS § 6:4 (15th ed.), Westlaw (database updated 
Oct. 2018). 
 29  See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2). 
 30  In re Wireless Tel. Fed. Cost Recovery Fees Litig., 396 F.3d 922, 934 (8th 
Cir. 2005). 
 31  Id. 
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components of the settlements, but rather view them in their en-
tirety” and consider the facts “in the light most favorable to the set-
tlement.”32 
The other theory treats the court as a fiduciary of the class. When 
examining and approving the settlement, the court becomes a fidu-
ciary to the parties bound by the settlement because “fiduciary rela-
tionship[s] usually arise . . . when one person assumes control and 
responsibility over another.”33 Judge Posner explains that “courts 
have gone so far as to term the district judge in the settlement phase 
of a class action suit a fiduciary of the class, who is subject therefore 
to the high duty of care that the law requires of fiduciaries.”34 There-
fore, being a fiduciary “requires district judges to exercise the high-
est degree of vigilance in scrutinizing proposed settlements of class 
actions.”35 In other words, “[a] court must approve a class action 
settlement because the parties that are present and settling the case—
class counsel, the class representatives, and the defendants—are 
proposing to compromise the rights of absent class members.”36  
Thus, a judge’s role in a class action settlement is peculiar and 
differs from the judge’s typical role “as a neutral arbiter between 
two competing parties.”37 In non-class-action settlements, because 
no fiduciary relationship exists, courts do not examine the fairness, 
reasonableness, and adequacy of the settlement and, unless there is 
                                                                                                                                        
 32  Isby v. Bayh 75 F.3d 1191, 1199 (7th Cir. 1996) (citing Armstrong v. Bd. 
of Sch. Dirs. of Milwaukee, 616 F.2d 305, 315 (7th Cir. 1980)). 
 33  Fiduciary Relationship, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 34  Reynolds v. Beneficial Nat’l Bank, 288 F.3d 277, 280 (7th Cir. 2002). 
 35  Id. at 279. 
 36  4 WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTION § 13:40 (5th ed.), 
Westlaw (database updated Nov. 2018). 
 37  Id. Compare CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE § 2363 (3d ed.), Westlaw (database updated Nov. 2018) (“A volun-
tary dismissal by stipulation [of all parties] under Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii) is effective 
immediately and does not require the court’s approval.”), and Adams v. USAA 
Cas. Ins. Co., 863 F.3d 1069, 1080 (8th Cir. 2017) (“Rule 41(a)(1) cases require 
no judicial approval or review as a prerequisite to dismissal; in fact, the dismissal 
is effective upon filing, with no court action required.”), with FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e) 
(“The claims, issues, or defenses of a certified class—or a class proposed to be 
certified for purposes of settlement—may be settled, voluntarily dismissed, or 
compromised only with the court’s approval.”). 
 
1002 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73:993 
a consent decree, courts have no power to interpret the settlement.38 
If, subsequently, a dispute arises as to the interpretation of the set-
tlement, parties can file a new lawsuit alleging a breach of contract.39 
However, if in a class action settlement the court is a fiduciary of 
the absent class members, the court needs to ensure that class repre-
sentatives and class counsel have not compromised plaintiffs’ inter-
ests in settling the case.40 Because the court is presented with a non-
adversarial mode of introducing a settlement, the court is “required 
to make a decision using a mode of decision-making unfamiliar to 
courts.”41 To fulfill this obligation, “the judge must adopt the role of 
a skeptical client and critically examine the class certification ele-
ments, the proposed settlement terms, and procedures for implemen-
tation.”42 
Assigning courts a continuing duty to ensure fairness of the set-
tlement also arises from difficulty, or even impossibility, to collat-
erally attack a properly approved settlement.43 This is because the 
Supreme Court ruled that “under elementary principles of prior ad-
judication . . . [a class action settlement] is binding on class mem-
bers in any subsequent litigation” as it would be in “[a] judgment in 
favor of either side [which] is conclusive in a subsequent action be-
                                                                                                                                        
 38  See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(a)(1); see, e.g., Adams, 863 F.3d at 1080 (stating 
that “[t]he reason for the [voluntary] dismissal is irrelevant under Rule 41(a)(1)” 
and holding “that the district court erred in concluding that counsel engaged in 
sanctionable conduct by stipulating to a dismissal under Rule 41(a)(1) for the pur-
pose of forum shopping and avoiding an adverse result”). Cf. Fred O. Goldberg, 
Enforcement of Settlements: A Jurisdictional Perspective, FLA. B.J., July/Aug. 
2011, at 31, 31–32 (discussing a similar proposition under the Florida Rules of 
Civil Procedure). 
 39  85 JAMES L. BUCHWALTER, CAUSES OF ACTION 2d § 4 (2d ed.), Westlaw 
(database updated Mar. 2019) (“As with contracts generally, the elements of a 
cause of action for breach of a settlement agreement are (1) the contract, (2) the 
plaintiff's performance or excuse for nonperformance, (3) the defendant's breach, 
and (4) the resulting damages to the plaintiff. . . . When interpreting a settlement 
agreement, a court must honor the intentions of the parties as reflected in the set-
tled usage of the terms they accepted in the agreement.”).  
 40  MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 28, § 6:4. 
 41  RUBENSTEIN, supra note 36, § 13:40. 
 42  Id. (quoting DAVID F. HERR, MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 21.61 
(4th ed. 2004)). 
 43  See MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 28, § 6:30. 
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tween them on any issue actually litigated and determined, if its de-
termination was essential to that judgment.”44 In other words, class 
members who fail to opt out of a class are bound by the settlement.45 
The only other means of a class member challenging the binding 
nature of a class settlement is a direct appeal from the district court’s 
approval of the settlement.46  Collateral attacks are thus frowned 
upon as they would undermine finality to judgments entered on class 
action settlements and “[c]ourts are wary of disturbing settlements, 
because they represent compromise and conservation of judicial re-
sources, two concepts highly regarded in American jurispru-
dence.”47 A collateral attack is available only in limited instances 
“to consider whether the procedures in the prior litigation afforded 
the party against whom the earlier judgment is asserted a full and 
fair opportunity to litigate the claim or issue.”48 
Despite the guidance of the Bennet and Reed factors and the 
newly added factors under Rule 23(e)(2) to help courts evaluate fair-
ness, reasonableness, and adequacy of a class action settlement, set-
tlements may still prove to be inequitable and ineffective—and the 
Deepwater Horizon Medical Settlement Agreement is a good exam-
ple of how “one of the fairest and most impressive [class action] 
settlements” went all wrong.49 If we agree with the stipulation that 
the district judge is a fiduciary to the class before the final judicial 
                                                                                                                                        
 44  Id. (quoting Cooper v. Fed. Reserve Bank of Richmond, 467 U.S. 867, 874 
(1984)). 
 45  Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 813 (1985); Matsushita 
Electric Industries Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367, 385 (1996); MCLAUGHLIN, supra 
note 28, § 6:30. 
 46  MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 28, § 6:30 (citing Devlin v. Scardelletti, 536 U.S. 
1, 10–11 (2002)). Circuit courts recognize district courts’ judicial discretion in 
approving the settlement as district judges have deeper knowledge of the facts of 
the case. Devlin, 536 U.S. at 22 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see, e.g., In re Prudential 
Ins. Co. Am. Sales Practice Litig. Agent Actions, 148 F.3d 283, 299 (3d Cir. 
1998).  
 47  MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 28, § 6:30 n.8 (quoting Anita Founds., Inc. v. 
ILGWU Nat’l Ret. Fund, 902 F.2d 185, 190 (2d Cir. 1990)). 
 48  Stephenson v. Dow Chemical Co., 273 F.3d 249, 258 n.6 (2d Cir. 2001), 
aff’d by an equally divided court in part, vacated in part, 539 U.S. 111 (2003) 
(per curiam) (quoting Epstein v. MCA, Inc., 179 F.3d 641, 648–49 (9th Cir. 
1999)) (internal quotation omitted). 
 49  Fairness Hearing, supra note 1, at 183.  
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approval, I argue that we should expand that fiduciary duty to cover 
the full time period to implement the settlement. 
II. DEEPWATER HORIZON MEDICAL SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT  
 In April 2010, the Deepwater Horizon, an oil drilling platform 
in the Gulf of Mexico, exploded and ultimately sunk.50 The explo-
sion and subsequent sinking of the Deepwater Horizon led to a dev-
astating oil spill.51 BP, one of the world’s largest oil companies, was 
ultimately held liable for the spill.52 During and after the spill, BP 
engaged tens of thousands of cleanup workers in a large-scale oper-
ation of containing and removing the oil.53 Their work lasted from 
late April 2010—immediately after the spill—until mid-June 2013, 
although most work was done by early April 2012.54 Cleanup work-
ers and coastal residents who suffered exposure to crude oil and 
Corexit, a toxic chemical sprayed over the Gulf to disperse the oil, 
brought personal injury lawsuits against BP and other companies in-
volved in this environmental disaster.55 Ultimately, parties entered 
into the MSA, which the District Court approved on January 11, 
                                                                                                                                        
 50  Deepwater Horizon – BP Gulf of Mexico Oil Spill, U.S. ENVTL. PROTEC-
TION AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/enforcement/deepwater-horizon-bp-gulf-
mexico-oil-spill (last visited Apr. 17, 2019). 
 51  Id. 
 52  In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon,” 21 F. Supp. 3d 657, 
757 (E.D. La. 2014) (finding BP sixty-seven percent (67%) liable for the oil spill). 
 53  See Repanich, supra note 9. It is estimated that around 200,000 people, 
cleanup workers and coastal residents, could belong to the class. Fairness Hearing, 
supra note 1, at 193. 
 54  Margaret M. Kitt, Protecting Workers in Large-Scale Emergency Re-
sponses, 53 J. OCCUPATIONAL & ENVTL. MED. 711, 711–12 (2011); Deepwater 
Horizon Oil Spill Timeline, Updated from April 2010 Through 2014, AL.COM 
(Apr. 20, 2014), https://www.al.com/news/beaches/index.ssf/2014/04/deep-
water_horizon_timeline_upd.html; Telephone Interview with Craig T. Downs, 
Founding Partner, The Downs Law Grp. (Feb. 2, 2018) [hereinafter Downs Tele-
phone Interview].  
 55  In August 2010, seventy-seven cases, including those brought by state gov-
ernments, individuals, and companies, were transferred to the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana under Multi-District Litigation 
docket MDL No. 2179. In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon,” 731 
F. Supp. 2d 132 (U.S. J.P.M.L. 2010). 
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2013.56 This was the same agreement that many established law 
scholars considered “one of the fairest settlements they had seen.”57  
 The Deepwater Horizon MSA divided the claims into two 
phases.58 Under the first phase, each class member with adequate 
affidavits or medical records was to be compensated for a Specified 
Physical Condition (“SPC”) according to the list of tables known as 
the “Matrix,” which specified medical conditions, times of physical 
manifestation of the condition, and proof required for compensa-
tion.59 Under the second phase, known as the Back-End Litigation 
Option (“BELO”), a class member with a “later-manifested physical 
condition” (“LMPC”) diagnosed after the cut-off date of April 16, 
2012, was to be allowed to litigate the claim in court.60 The lucrative 
enterprise of claim processing and administration was assigned to 
the Garretson Resolution Group (“Garretson,” often referred to in 
Court documents as “GRG” or “Claims Administrator”).61  
A. Compensation Under the Matrix: Specified Physical Condition 
 To be compensated under the SPC, a claimant had to go through 
several steps and meet multiple requirements.62 First, a claimant had 
to submit a Proof of Claim form to Garretson.63 The form was a 
twenty-eight-page document asking for personal and background in-
formation, basis for participation in the MSA, proof of status as 
cleanup worker or zone resident, benefits claimed, information on 
medical conditions, as well as information about bankruptcy, liens, 
and healthcare insurance coverage.64 Claimants had to submit the 
form to Garretson no later than one year after the “effective date” of 
February 12, 2014 or they would lose their right to be compensated 
                                                                                                                                        
 56  Final Approval of the Deepwater Horizon MSA, 295 F.R.D. 112 (E.D. La. 
2013). 
 57  Fairness Hearing, supra note 1, at 183. 
 58  See MSA, supra note 5, §§ VI, VIII. 
 59  Id. § VI; Matrix, supra note 10. 
 60  MSA, supra note 5, § VIII. 
 61  Id. § XVIII.A.11. 
 62  Id. § VI. 
 63  Id. § VI.A. 
 64  Medical Benefits Class Action Settlement: Proof of Claim Form, Final Ap-
proval of the Deepwater Horizon MSA, 295 F.R.D. 112 (E.D. La. 2013) (MDL 
No. 2179), Doc. No. 6427-7. 
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under the SPC.65  
 Depending on the type of medical condition suffered because of 
exposure and the level of proof presented, claimants could qualify 
for different levels of compensation.66 To receive the lowest com-
pensation under A1 level ($1,300 for cleanup workers and $900 for 
zone residents), a claimant had to declare the manifestation of a 
medical condition within a prescribed timeframe (within seventy-
two hours of exposure).67 Compensable conditions enumerated in 
the Matrix included dermatitis (rash), conjunctivitis (eye irritation 
or eye burn), sinusitis (nasal inflammation), pharyngitis (throat irri-
tation), as well as acute conditions such as headache, dizziness, and 
fainting.68  
 Higher levels of compensation required more proof.69 To qualify 
for higher compensation, A2, A3, and A4 (a lump sum between 
$2,700 and $12,350), a claimant had to present supporting medical 
records that Garretson evaluated “based on the totality of the evi-
dence . . . whether that evidence more likely than not supports the 
assertions made in the declaration.”70  To qualify for the highest 
level of compensation, B1 ($60,700 for cleanup workers and 
$36,950 for zone residents), a claimant had to present relevant med-
ical records establishing ongoing care for a chronic condition as well 
as “indicate that exposure was considered by either the claimant or 
the medical professional to be related to the condition(s) or symp-
tom(s).”71 Garretson later interpreted this provision as requiring not 
only medical diagnosis, but also doctor’s statement that the medical 
condition resulted from exposure to crude oil or Corexit.72 
                                                                                                                                        
 65  See MSA, supra note 5, § V.A; Press Release, GRG Subject Matter Ex-
perts, Deepwater Horizon Medical Settlement Effective Date Announced; Claims 
Administrator Garretson Resolution Group to Begin Processing Claims (Feb. 14, 
2014), https://web.garretsongroup.com/press-releases/press-release/deepwater-
horizon-medical-settlement-effective-date-announced-claims-administrator-gar-
retson-resolution-group-begin-processing-claims [hereinafter GRG Press Re-
lease]. 
 66  See MSA, supra note 5, § VI. 
 67  Matrix, supra note 10, at 1, 13–14. 
 68  Id. at 6–8, 12. 
 69  Id. at 1–5. 
 70  Id. at 1–3. 
 71  Id. at 4–5.  
 72  Downs Telephone Interview, supra note 54. 
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 Garretson then evaluated the form’s “sufficiency and complete-
ness” pursuant to § XXI.C–F of the MSA.73 Among other tasks, 
Garretson verified whether a claimant could either be found in one 
of the cleanup worker training, employment, or medical encounter 
databases, or had enough documents to claim zone residency.74 If 
either the form or the required documents were incomplete or insuf-
ficient, Garretson sent the claimant a Notice of Defect that contained 
a brief explanation of why the form was being rejected and whether, 
and how, claimant could cure the defect.75 If Garretson denied a 
SPC claim for compensation, a claimant could request a one-time 
review conducted by Garretson.76 After receiving the Notice of De-
nial, a claimant had fourteen days to request such review by submit-
ting a Request for Review form and any necessary additional docu-
ments.77  
 Theoretically, the process of compensation under the SPC was 
simple and straightforward—the more proof of suffered medical 
condition a claimant presented, the higher the compensation he or 
she was to receive.78 However, as Part III of this Comment will 
show, there were multiple problems with applying and interpreting 
the SPC provisions, and these problems precluded many class mem-
bers from receiving compensation.79 
B. Back-End Litigation Option 
 To be compensated under the BELO, a plaintiff must first submit 
to Garretson a written Notice of Intent to Sue (“NOIS)” and identify 
particular diagnosed medical conditions that the plaintiff will allege 
in the BELO claim.80 After the NOIS is submitted, Garretson then 
reviews the submission for compliance and, if the diagnosed medi-
cal conditions meet the requirement, Garretson transmits the NOIS 
                                                                                                                                        
 73  MSA, supra note 5, §§ V.B, V.D, XXI.C–F. 
 74  Id. § XXI.D–E. 
 75  Id. § V.E. 
 76  Id. § V.M.  
 77  Id.; Medical Benefits Class Action Settlement: Request for Review Form, 
Final Approval of the Deepwater Horizon MSA, 295 F.R.D. 112 (E.D. La. 2013) 
(MDL No. 2179), Doc. No. 6427-9. 
 78  See Matrix, supra note 10, at 1–5. 
 79  See infra Part III. 
 80  MSA, supra note 5, §§ II.VV, II.UUU, VIII.A. 
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to BP.81 The MSA requires Garretson to review the NOIS and trans-
mit it to BP within ten days.82 Then, BP has thirty days to choose 
whether to mediate the claim.83 If BP chooses not to mediate, the 
plaintiff acquires the right to file a BELO action, provided it is filed 
within six months of the date Garretson informs the plaintiff of BP’s 
decision not to mediate.84 Thereafter, the parties have ninety days 
for initial disclosures.85 These include documents required under 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(1)(A), as well as additional 
documents required by the Case Management Order (“CMO”).86 
Before the end of the 120-day initial proceedings period, the parties 
must either stipulate to remain in the Eastern District of Louisiana 
or to be transferred to another United States District Court for fur-
ther proceedings.87 In case of disagreement, parties may submit mo-
tions regarding the proper venue.88  
 Neither the CMO nor the MSA specify how, and whether, a 
BELO complaint can be amended.89 For example, there is no clear 
process for how a plaintiff is to amend the BELO complaint in cases 
where the plaintiff becomes diagnosed with additional medical con-
ditions that are claimed to result from the exposure during cleanup.90 
Such cases are not unusual, especially when it takes Garretson as 
long as eight months—instead of ten days as mandated by the 
MSA—to process the NOIS.91 While BP argues that plaintiffs may 
                                                                                                                                        
 81  Id. § XXI.I. 
 82  Id. § VIII.C.1. 
 83  Id. 
 84  Id. § VIII.C.2. 
 85  BELO Cases Initial Proceedings Case Management Order ¶ II, In re Oil 
Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon,” MDL No. 2179 (E.D. La. Apr. 27, 
2016), Doc. No. 14099 [hereinafter CMO]. 
 86  Id.; FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1)(A). 
 87  CMO, supra note 85, ¶ III(1). 
 88  Id. ¶ III(2). 
 89  See id.; MSA, supra note 5, § VIII. 
 90  See MSA, supra note 5, § VIII. 
 91  Plaintiff’s Unopposed Motion to Stay Proceedings and Memorandum in 
Support ¶ 8, Odom v. BP Am. Prod. Co., No. 17-CV-0202-DAE (W.D. Tex. Oct. 
25, 2017) [hereinafter Odom Unopposed Motion to Stay Proceedings]. 
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not “add additional claims for newly alleged [medical condi-
tions],”92 some plaintiffs reason that they may essentially add new 
medical conditions by staying the pending complaint, submitting an-
other NOIS with new medical conditions to Garretson, and then, af-
ter waiting for Garretson to process the NOIS, consolidating both 
BELO claims.93 Such procedure, which practically makes amending 
BELO complaints impossible, seems unnecessarily difficult and 
burdensome for plaintiff.94 
 Only limited issues may be litigated in a BELO action.95 These 
include the fact of correct medical diagnosis, the amount and loca-
tion of crude oil and Corexit, the level and duration of claimant’s 
exposure, the fact of legal causation, alternative causes of injury, 
and the amount of compensatory damages.96  However, punitive 
damages are disallowed.97 Arguing over the amount and location of 
crude oil and Corexit may be problematic because there are no pre-
cise maps of where and when crude oil appeared and where Corexit 
was sprayed.98 Thus, to prove the fact of exposure and the level of 
contamination plaintiffs will have to rely on cleanup workers’ and 
residents’ testimony, as well as on local media reports. 
III. HOW THE DEEPWATER HORIZON MSA PROVED TO BE UNFAIR, 
UNREASONABLE, AND INADEQUATE 
 Over time, despite the initial enthusiasm from the academic 
                                                                                                                                        
 92  The BP Parties’ Response to Plaintiff’s Motion to Stay Proceedings at 2, 
Odom v. BP Am. Prod. Co., No. 17-CV-0202-DAE, No. 17-CV-0202-DAE 
(W.D. Tex. Oct. 30, 2017). 
 93   Odom Unopposed Motion to Stay Proceedings, supra note 91, ¶ 8; see also 
MSA, supra note 5, §§ II.UUU, VIII.A, VIII.C.1, XXI.I. 
 94  Telephone Interview with Charles F. Herd, Jr., The Lanier Law Firm (Jan. 
31, 2018) [hereinafter Herd Telephone Interview]. 
 95  MSA, supra note 5, § VIII.G.3.a. 
 96  Id.  
 97  Id. 
 98  See Environmental Response Management Application: Gulf of Mexico, 
NOAA, https://erma.noaa.gov/gulfofmexico/erma.html#/layers=3+446+5328+ 
16023+482&x=-89.87561&y=28.90952&z=6&panel=layer (last visited on Apr. 
4, 2019) (select “Deepwater Horizon MC 252 Incident” layer); Tracking the Oil 
Spill in the Gulf, N.Y. TIMES, http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2010/05/01/ 
us/20100501-oil-spill-tracker.html (last visited on Apr. 17, 2019).  
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community,99 the MSA has proven to be unfair to many class mem-
bers as well as inefficient, as it threatens to burden the federal court 
system with unnecessary litigation. From the outset, the settlement’s 
healthcare provisions have not provided much-needed medical help 
and condition diagnoses to often uninsured class members.100 This 
resulted in many claimants’ inability to be diagnosed or to gather 
sufficient medical documentation before the required deadline.101 
At the same time, claimants had to fight Garretson, who disregarded 
some of the MSA provisions, showed incompetence, and often, in-
stead of staying impartial and objective, sided with BP.102 Further, 
because of failing some procedural requirements of the MSA, many 
claimants were undercompensated or not compensated at all for 
their injuries, and their claims were moved to the second litigation-
based phase of the settlement.103 These BELO claims, because of 
the high number of potential claimants, threaten to congest many 
federal district courts with highly technical cases in which plaintiffs 
must prove a causal connection between their injuries and exposure 
to crude oil and Corexit.104 The story of the MSA thus shows that 
without a court’s continuing obligation to ensure fairness of class 
action settlement under Rule 23(e)(2), end results of even a meticu-
lously designed settlement may be unjust and ineffective in reaching 
its goals in compensating large groups of harmed individuals.  
A. Inadequacy of the MSA’s Medical Provisions  
 To provide the former cleanup workers and zone residents with 
proper medical care, BP and the Plaintiff Steering Committee agreed 
to include in the MSA the Periodic Medical Consultation Program 
(“PMCP”) and the Gulf Region Health Outreach Program 
(“GRHOP”).105  These initiatives, however, were not designed to 
                                                                                                                                        
 99  See supra notes 1–3 and accompanying text. 
 100  See infra Section III.A.  
 101  See infra Section III.B. 
 102  See infra Sections III.B, III.F. 
 103  See infra Sections III.B, III.C. 
 104  See infra Section III.D. 
 105  MSA, supra note 5, §§ VII, IX. 
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help identify medical conditions caused by the oil spill and subse-
quent cleanup efforts.106 As a result, medical conditions of many in-
digent class members without health insurance were not properly 
diagnosed before the cut-off date, barring those class members from 
making valid claims under the first phase of the settlement, the 
SPC.107 Plaintiffs argue that this medical program was nothing more 
than a façade on behalf of BP to create the illusion that BP was act-
ing on plaintiffs’ behalves, only to hide BP’s objective of minimiz-
ing payments to class members.108 
 Richard Godfrey, the defendants’ attorney, and Robin Green-
wald, an attorney of the Plaintiff Steering Committee, presented the 
purpose of and the procedures for implementing the PMCP and the 
GRHOP during the Fairness Hearing.109 The principal goals of these 
two programs, respectively, were to provide “a significant and tan-
gible benefit, especially to those class members who might not oth-
erwise have access to or be able to afford primary medical ser-
vices”110 and “to increase . . . the capacity of healthcare systems 
throughout the areas that were most impacted by the oil spill.”111 As 
defendants explained with respect to the PMCP, “we have a medical 
care issue in this country, and many [claimants], or at least some of 
these people, may not have had access [to healthcare] . . . they now 
have access and will be given access [to healthcare]. That's an im-
portant benefit [of the MSA].”112  
 Thus, it was a stated goal of the PMCP to help class members in 
receiving medical care.113 To implement the program, first, Garret-
son would “enter into a written contract with each medical services 
provider selected to provide medical consultation visits” near class 
members’ places of residence.114 Then, Garretson was supposed to 
                                                                                                                                        
 106  Id. The following paragraphs expand on the notion that the PMCP and the 
GRHOP were not designed to help diagnose medical conditions for SPC claims. 
 107  Downs Telephone Interview supra note 54. 
 108  Id.  
 109  See Fairness Hearing, supra note 1, at 49–76, 180–96. 
 110  Id. at 218.  
 111  Id. at 190. 
 112  Id. at 218. 
 113  Id.  
 114  MSA, supra note 5, § VII.C.4. 
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contact every class member, find out where they lived, find the clos-
est facility to do medical tests and consultations, and schedule an 
appointment for each person.115 Appointments were to be scheduled 
every three years for the next twenty-one years following the effec-
tive date of February 12, 2014.116 Medical visits were to consist of 
a medical examination, a vision screening, and additional blood, 
urine, cardiac, and respiratory tests performed at the discretion of 
the physician.117 Overall, defendants maintained that “[t]he program 
w[ould] have a rapid positive impact on the physical, mental and 
behavioral health of Gulf Coast community members, and these 
benefits will be realized not just for the five years but long thereaf-
ter.”118 
 The MSA, however, created a paradoxical situation that made 
the PMCP purposeless. Generally, to claim the program’s benefits 
and be tested for a claimed medical condition, a claimant would 
have to have first filed an SPC claim, in which he or she had to both 
ask to be qualified for the program, as well as claim their medical 
condition under the SPC.119 This meant that the only way to claim 
compensation above the basic A1 level ($1,300 for cleanup workers 
and $900 for residents) at A2, A3, A4, and B1 levels (which required 
medical documentation), was for a claimant to have a medical diag-
nosis of his or her condition made not under the PMCP, but paid 
from his or her own pocket.120 This was disastrous for many indigent 
class members who did not have health insurance and could not pay 
for costly medical tests required to get diagnosis.121 Therefore, these 
class members never had the means to get their conditions diagnosed 
for the purpose of an SPC claim.122 As Greenwald admitted during 
the Fairness Hearing, there was “no fund set up for people . . . to go 
to a doctor and get their diagnoses” and there was “no place that they 
                                                                                                                                        
 115  Fairness Hearing, supra note 1, at 252–53. 
 116  Id. at 189; MSA, supra note 5, § VII.B.3. 
 117  Components of the Periodic Medical Consultation Program, Final Ap-
proval of the Deepwater Horizon MSA, 295 F.R.D. 112 (E.D. La. 2013) (MDL 
No. 2179), Doc. No. 6427-14.  
 118  Fairness Hearing, supra note 1, at 218. 
 119  MSA, supra note 5, §§ VI.D., VII.A. 
 120  See Matrix, supra note 10, at 1–5. 
 121  Downs Telephone Interview, supra note 54. 
 122  Id.; Fairness Hearing, supra note 1, at 257–58. 
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[could] go before they file[d] their claim form to find out what they 
ha[d].”123 If a claimant could not be diagnosed for the purpose of 
receiving compensation, what then was the purpose of the PMCP? 
 Practically speaking, if a claimant could not afford medical di-
agnosis—a process that often included not just a visit to a primary 
care physician, but also multiple visits to and costly medical tests 
from a specialist—such a claimant was arguably precluded from re-
ceiving compensation higher than the A1 level. Jason Melancon, 
one of the objectors to the MSA, stated as much during the Fairness 
Hearing: “[G]uess how much money has been allocated to give 
[class members] an initial diagnosis? None. There isn’t a single 
penny allocated to where my clients can see someone right now and 
figure out whether or not they have a chronic problem that is asso-
ciated from their exposure.”124 Melancon proposed that the MSA 
should include the right to go to a doctor for initial evaluation.125 
But, instead of allocating funds for the purpose of helping class 
members receive medical diagnosis, BP and the Plaintiff Steering 
Committee agreed in the MSA to spend $105 million on enigmatic 
community outreach programs.126 These programs were “a set of in-
tegrated projects designed to improve healthcare capacity and health 
literacy for Class Members and others in Gulf Coast communi-
ties.”127 As Melancon concluded,  
 
I love the fact that it is an open-ended, uncapped set-
tlement, theoretically. . . . [But] if [you] can't go to 
the doctor, and you can't afford to see a doctor, or 
                                                                                                                                        
 123  Fairness Hearing, supra note 1, at 257–58. 
 124  Id. at 244. 
 125  Id. at 247. 
 126  MSA, supra note 5, § IX (outlining the “Gulf Region Health Outreach Pro-
gram,” which had the stated purpose of “expand[ing] capacity for and access to 
high quality, sustainable, community-based healthcare services”). 
 127  Final Approval of the Deepwater Horizon MSA, 295 F.R.D. 112, 123 (E.D. 
La. 2013); see also MSA, supra note 5, § IX. To Melancon’s suggestion that the 
MSA does not specify what “community outreach programs for mental and be-
havioral health services” are, Judge Barbier responded to “Google it and find out.” 
Fairness Hearing, supra note 1, at 247. Unfortunately, even the most laborious 
search engine inquiries do not bring any cogent explanation of the meaning of 
“community outreach programs for mental and behavioral health services.” Id. 
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you can't afford to see a toxicologist, then you're nec-
essarily going to be shuffled into the $1300 classifi-
cation.128 
Melancon’s prediction came true as the MSA essentially put “a prac-
tical cap [on recovery under the SPC], despite the fact that there 
[was] no theoretical cap.”129 
B. Some SPC Claims Were Unnecessarily Moved into BELO 
 As Melancon predicted during the Fairness Hearing,130 many 
class members whose claims were denied—either because they 
lacked proper medical documentation or due to defendant-friendly 
interpretations of the settlement agreement by the claims adminis-
trator—are being forced into the litigation phase of the settlement.131 
A class member who did not receive appropriate medical help in 
diagnosing his or her recurring health symptoms (e.g. skin irritation, 
cough, wheeze, tightness in the chest, and burning in the eyes, nose, 
throat, or lungs being symptoms of acute or chronic dermatitis, si-
nusitis, or conjunctivitis) could only claim $1,300 in damages, as 
opposed to $12,350 or $60,700.132 Many of these claimants, some 
with multiple conditions, will now have to participate in the litiga-
tion phase that was originally intended for class members with med-
ical conditions manifesting years after the exposure, including leu-
kemia and other cancers.133 
Seemingly straightforward, the MSA is vague in describing un-
der what circumstances a claimant could qualify for the SPC,134 and 
also when his or her claim is being pushed into BELO.135 Although 
Garretson (and BP) managed to eventually persuade the court that 
the MSA was unambiguous in this matter, such interpretation is 
                                                                                                                                        
 128  Fairness Hearing, supra note 1, at 244. 
 129  Id.  
 130  Id. at 249. 
 131  Downs Telephone Interview, supra note 54. 
 132  See Matrix, supra note 10, at 1–5. 
 133  See Fairness Hearing, supra note 1, at 255–56. 
 134  See MSA, supra note 5, § VI. 
 135  See id. § VIII.G. 
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problematic.136 Paradoxically, although Garretson admitted that it 
“ha[d] no authority to interpret [the MSA’s] terms,” in the very same 
memorandum, it interpreted the terms of the MSA regarding classi-
fication of diagnosis made after April 16, 2012.137 Garretson argued 
that when the MSA’s definition of “later-manifested physical con-
dition” under section II was read together with section VIII.B.1, its 
meaning was clear.138 Later-manifested physical condition was to 
“mean a physical condition that is first diagnosed in a [claimant] 
after April 16, 2012.”139 Additionally, per MSA section VIII.B.1, a 
claimant “who is diagnosed with a [LMPC] may either (i) seek com-
pensation for that [LMPC] pursuant to workers’ compensation 
law . . . or (ii) seek compensation from BP for that [LMPC] pursuant 
to the [BELO]. Such [claimant] may not seek compensation . . . in 
any other manner.”140  
Garretson concluded that because of this language, a claimant 
who meets LMPC requirements “is foreclosed from seeking com-
pensation for a [SPC].”141 However, the language of the MSA does 
not unequivocally exclude claimants who qualify for LMPC from 
having an SPC claim under the Matrix.142 In other words, the MSA 
does not state that the LMPC and the SPC are mutually exclusive.143 
Further, it does not explain that if a claimant is eligible for the 
LMPC, he or she is automatically forced out of the first settlement 
phase into the second, litigation-based phase. 144  Judge Barbier, 
however, agreed with Garretson’s and BP’s interpretation of the 
                                                                                                                                        
 136  Downs Telephone Interview, supra note 54; see Memorandum from Gar-
retson Resolution Group, Claims Administrator, to Hon. Sally Shushan (May 13, 
2014), Classification of Chronic Physical Conditions First Diagnosed After April 
16, 2012 at 2, In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon, MDL No. 2179 
(E.D. La. July 14, 2014) [hereinafter Garretson SPC Memorandum]. 
 137   Garretson SPC Memorandum, supra note 136.  
 138  Id. 
 139  MSA, supra note 5, § II.VV.  
 140  Id. § VIII.B.1. 
 141  Garretson SPC Memorandum, supra note 136, at 2. 
 142  MSA, supra note 5, § VIII.B. 
 143  See id.  
 144  See id.  
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MSA that a class member who was diagnosed with a chronic condi-
tion after April 16, 2012, was excluded from asserting an SPC claim, 
and could only assert a LMPC claim under the BELO.145 
Earlier understanding by both the plaintiffs and the defendants 
during the Fairness Hearing contradicts this new interpretation of 
the MSA.146 Robin Greenwald, a liaison counsel for the plaintiffs, 
made an un-contradicted statement that “[BELO] is designed for 
people who get sick 5, 10, 15, 20 years from now.”147 She also stated 
that “all class members can sue BP on what’s call[ed] a B[E]LO, a 
back-end litigation option, if they were to unfortunately experience 
a later manifested physical condition.”148 Similarly, Richard God-
frey, one of defendants’ attorneys, stated that “if you discover . . . 
that you have what you consider to be a later-manifesting condition, 
then you have the B[E]LO that you have to decide and exercise your 
rights under.”149 Godfrey provided this interpretation of the BELO 
during a discussion of the benefits of the PMCP, which, as he stated, 
gave class members “the opportunity to learn whether or not there 
is going to be some [medical] condition that they are not aware 
of.”150 Godfrey’s statement may be understood to mean that the 
BELO was designed to provide a litigation backdoor to those class 
members whose conditions manifested during a medical screening 
under the PMCP, which was to be available on the “effective date” 
of February 12, 2014.151 Thus, the widely accepted understanding—
of both the plaintiffs and the defendants—was that the BELO would 
apply only to later-manifested conditions and not to conditions that 
had appeared during the twenty-four to seventy-two hour timeframe 
                                                                                                                                        
 145  Order Regarding Medical Benefits Settlement – Policy Statement on Clas-
sification of Chronic Physical Conditions First Diagnosed After April 16, 2012, 
In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon,” MDL No. 2179 (E.D. La. 
July 23, 2014), Rec. Doc. 13,179 [hereinafter Order Regarding Medical Benefits 
Settlement].  
 146  See Fairness Hearing, supra note 1, at 190, 216–17, 255. 
 147  Id. at 255. 
 148  Id. at 190. 
 149  Id. at 217. 
 150  Id. at 216. 
 151  MSA, supra note 5, § VII.B.3 (“The PERIODIC MEDICAL CONSUL-
TATION PROGRAM shall begin on the EFFECTIVE DATE, and last for 21 
years from the EFFECTIVE DATE.”); GRG Press Release, supra note 65. 
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provided in the Matrix but were diagnosed by a medical professional 
after April 16, 2012. 
Another problem is that, although the MSA includes definitions 
for over a hundred different terms, it fails to define the terms “diag-
nosed” or “diagnosis.”152 If Garretson, as it claimed, “is bound to 
follow the plain language in the MSA,”153 it should also admit that 
the plain meaning of the term “diagnosed condition” is not neces-
sarily equivalent with a medically diagnosed condition or with a 
condition diagnosed by a medical professional, but could just as well 
mean “self-diagnosed condition.”154 Merriam Webster defines the 
verb “diagnose” as “to recognize (something, such as a disease) by 
signs and symptoms” or as “to analyze the cause or nature of.”155 
Therefore, the plain meaning of the word does not necessarily 
equate to medical diagnosis made by a medical professional. The 
question that the Court did not consider is whether a class member 
who recognized his or her own medical condition without having it 
diagnosed by a medical professional should nonetheless be automat-
ically excluded from making a claim under the SPC. 
Continuing with the semantic vagueness of the MSA, the settle-
ment’s definition of the LMPC does not explain the meaning of 
“later manifested.”156 If “later manifested” refers to a condition that 
manifested itself after the timeframe provided in the Matrix, (i.e. ei-
ther twenty-four or seventy-two hours after exposure, depending on 
the resulting medical condition) and the time of medical diagnosis 
is after April 16, 2012, then, under the current interpretation, the 
MSA created a gap between the SPC claim and BELO claims.157 
For example, if a claimant’s medical condition manifested itself af-
ter the time between exposure and manifestation, as provided in the 
Matrix, and was also diagnosed by a medical professional before the 
cut-off deadline of April 16, 2012, the claimant has no avenue for 
                                                                                                                                        
 152  MSA, supra note 5, § II. 
 153  Garretson SPC Memorandum, supra note 136, at 2. 
 154  Definition of Diagnose, MERRIAM WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-web-
ster.com/dictionary/diagnose (last visited Apr. 9, 2019). 
 155  Id. 
 156  MSA, supra note 5, §§ II.VV. 
 157  Matrix, supra note 10, at 6–14. 
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legal redress.158 Such a claimant would neither qualify for a remedy 
under the SPC (because his or her condition manifested itself too 
late, after the timeframe provided for in the Matrix) nor under the 
BELO (because the condition was diagnosed by a medical profes-
sional too early, before the cutoff date of April 16, 2012).159 
Under a scenario such as this, a claimant must either (1) lie about 
the time when his or her condition manifested itself and sign a “dec-
laration under penalty of perjury . . . asserting that such condition(s) 
(or the symptom(s) thereof) occurred within the applicable 
timeframe,” or (2) conceal any medical diagnosis made before April 
16, 2012, and get a new diagnosis after that date to qualify for the 
BELO.160 Either solution forces the claimant to behave unethically 
or fraudulently if he or she wants to be compensated.  
Finally, the decision to interpret the meaning of the MSA was 
made retroactively, meaning that it bound claimants without allow-
ing them an opportunity to adapt their strategy for receiving com-
pensation to the changing interpretation of the settlement.161 From 
November 2012, when the MSA was still being approved by the 
court, until April 2014, when BP and Garretson proposed their in-
terpretation of the LMPC, plaintiffs’ attorneys were not able to pre-
dict that the MSA would be interpreted to preclude recovery by 
claimants whose conditions were not diagnosed by a medical pro-
fessional before April 16, 2012 from making a claim under the 
SPC.162 As one cleanup worker explained, he does not understand 
how he and his fellow workers were supposed to know they needed 
to get a medical diagnosis before April 2012, since at that time the 
MSA had not even been approved yet, and the class members there-
fore still did not know the final conditions of the settlement.163  
 
                                                                                                                                        
 158  Id.; MSA, supra note 5, § II.VV; see Fairness Hearing, supra note 1, at 
233–34. 
 159  See MSA, supra note 5, §§ VI, VIII. 
 160  Matrix, supra note 10, at 1–2, 4. 
 161  Downs Telephone Interview, supra note 54. 
 162  Id.; Fairness Hearing, supra note 1, at 190. 
 163  David Hammer, BP Medical Interpretation Could Cut out Thousands, 
USA TODAY (Aug. 15, 2014, 1:17 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news 
/nation/2014/08/15/bp-spill-cleanup-medical-claims/14094089/. 
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C. Many SPC Claims Were Uncompensated  
or Undercompensated 
Another problem under the MSA is that the settlement gave Gar-
retson an almost absolute and virtually unreviewable power to de-
termine whether claims are valid or not and what level of compen-
sation is due to each claimant. As of November 2018, when Garret-
son filed its latest periodic status report, 22,836 claimants had been 
awarded $67.2 million in compensation.164 Thus, the average com-
pensation per person has been around $2,944.165 Not all awards were 
paid to the claimants: 490 claimants had unresolved liens, such as 
healthcare- and bankruptcy-related liens, which precluded pay-
ment.166  At the same time, thirty-six percent (36%) of the total 
37,225 claimants (or 13,403 claimants) were denied any compensa-
tion under SPC.167  
The small number of awarded claims and amounts of compen-
sation contrast starkly with the expected implementation of the 
MSA that plaintiffs’ and defendants’ attorneys presented to the court 
at the Fairness Hearing.168 For example, during the Fairness Hear-
ing, Robin Greenwald, representing plaintiffs, suspected that around 
200,000 people, cleanup workers and residents, could belong to the 
class.169 In April 2010, approximately 105,000 coastal residents that 
could qualify for compensation lived in the MSA-designated zones, 
and approximately 13,000 cleanup workers made approximately 





                                                                                                                                        
 164  November 2018 Status Report, supra note 11, at 3. 
 165  Of course, this is an average, which means that the wide majority of ap-
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D. Uncompensated or Undercompensated SPC  
Claims Could Clog Federal Courts 
Because of the decision to preclude the class members who qual-
ify for a LMPC claim from asserting an SPC claim, many claimants 
were forced out of compensation under the Matrix and into the 
BELO, which is a costlier second phase of the settlement agreement 
requiring litigation. 171  The denied SPC claims (possibly several 
thousands of them), instead of being compensated according to the 
Matrix, will soon be flooding federal courts, causing potential dis-
ruptions and clogging dockets.172 Only a few of these cases have al-
ready been filed, and there is a risk that not all claimants will have 
their day in court as some of the claims will be below-cost cases that 
attorneys will not want to work on, especially because they are la-
bor-intensive and prospective damages are too low.173 
Plaintiffs’ attorneys expect that in the next few years, claimants 
are likely to file thousands of BELO claims.174 As of November 
2018,  class members had filed a total of 6,699 Notice of Intention 
to Sue claims (“NOIS”), 4,080 of them were approved by Garretson, 
and, of those, 2,673 claims have been eligible to be filed in the East-
ern District of Louisiana.175  In fact, many more, “possibly thou-
sands,” of BELO claims are expected to flood the Eastern District 
of Louisiana, as well as other federal courts that will be handling 
these cases.176 
 
                                                                                                                                        
 171  Order Regarding Medical Benefits Settlement, supra note 145, at 6.  
 172  However, some plaintiff attorneys argue that medical claims under the Ma-
trix—even those B1 claims that Garretson rejected because they were diagnosed 
after the cut-off date of April 16, 2012—cannot be litigated under the BELO and 
that only non-Matrix conditions, such as cancers, can be litigated under the BELO. 
Telephone Interview with Andre F. Toce, Principal Attorney, The Toce Firm (Jan. 
30, 2018) [hereinafter Toce Telephone Interview]. Nonetheless, other plaintiff at-
torneys agree that previously uncompensated SPC claims can be litigated under 
the BELO. See Back-End Litigation Option Complaint ¶ 22, McGill v. BP Expl. 
& Prod., Inc., No. 2:18-cv-00130-CJB-JCW (E.D. La. Jan. 4, 2018) (listing 
chronic sinusitis as one of the claimed conditions caused by the exposure).  
 173  Downs Telephone Interview, supra note 54. 
 174  Herd Telephone Interview, supra note 94. 
 175  November 2018 Status Report, supra note 11, at 11–13.  
 176  Herd Telephone Interview, supra note 94. 
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E. Many BELO Claims Will Be Transferred to  
Other District Courts Around the United States  
 The massive number of expected BELO claims will not only 
pose a problem for the Eastern District of Louisiana, but also for 
other district courts across the United States. This is because BELO 
claims are likely to be adjudicated not where the injury occurred 
(which would include the four federal districts along the Gulf), but 
where plaintiffs currently reside and where their medical conditions 
were treated.177 In transferring venue, courts follow 28 U.S.C. § 
1404(a) which states that “[f]or the convenience of parties and wit-
nesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil 
action to any other district or division where it might have been 
brought or to any district or division to which all parties have con-
sented.”178  
 To determine when a § 1404(a) venue transfer is appropriate, 
courts follow the Gilbert test that applies four private interest factors 
and four public interest factors.179 The private interest factors in-
clude “(1) the relative ease of access to sources of proof; (2) the 
availability of compulsory process to secure the attendance of wit-
nesses; (3) the cost of attendance for willing witnesses; and (4) all 
other practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious 
and inexpensive.”180 Additionally, the public interest factors include  
 
(1) the administrative difficulties flowing from court 
congestion; (2) the local interest in having localized 
interests decided at home; (3) the familiarity of the 
forum with the law that will govern the case; and (4) 
the avoidance of unnecessary problems of conflict of 
laws [or in] the application of foreign law.181  
 The Eastern District of Louisiana has already applied the Gilbert 
factors in some of the BELO cases to determine the most suitable 
                                                                                                                                        
 177  28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2012). 
 178  Id. 
 179  In re Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 545 F.3d 304, 315 (5th Cir. 2008) (en banc) 
(quoting In re Volkswagen AG, 371 F.3d 201, 203 (5th Cir. 2004)). 
 180  Id. 
 181  Id. 
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venue.182 For example, in one case where the plaintiff worked and 
was injured in Jefferson Parish, in the Eastern District of Louisiana, 
but currently resides and is treated for his health conditions in Baton 
Rouge in the Middle District of Louisiana, the court transferred the 
case to the Middle District of Louisiana.183 In another case where 
plaintiff resided and worked in Pensacola, in the Northern District 
of Florida, but later moved and has been treated for his medical con-
ditions in San Antonio, Texas, the court transferred the case to the 
Western District of Texas.184 
 In many cases, scattering BELO claims around different district 
courts—even after applying the Gilbert factors—may lead to unjust 
and unreasonable results. For example, if a claimant was a cleanup 
worker in Alabama or northern Florida but currently resides and is 
treated in Miami, Florida, his or her case will likely be heard in the 
Southern District of Florida.185 As one plaintiff explains, “trial of 
this case in [a district court outside the Gulf region] is expected to 
take longer, since more time will be needed to educate the judge 
and/or jury on these issues.”186 This is because it takes time for each 
presiding judge to become familiar with even just the most im-
portant documents of the over 25,000-item docket,187 including the 
                                                                                                                                        
 182  See Order and Reasons on Motion at 2, Odom v. BP Am. Prod. Co., No. 
16-CV-15974  (E.D. La. Mar. 15, 2017) [hereinafter Odom Order and Reasons on 
Motion]; Order and Reasons on Motions at 2–3, Worley v. BP Expl. & Prod., Inc., 
No. 16-3620 (E.D. La. Sept. 7, 2016) [hereinafter Worley Order and Reasons on 
Motions]. 
 183  Worley Order and Reasons on Motions, supra note 182. 
 184  Odom Order and Reasons on Motion, supra note 182. 
 185  See Annie Correal, The Life of Hispanic Immigrant Cleanup Workers in 
the Gulf, FEET 2 WORLDS (June 24, 2010), http://www.fi2w.org/2010/06/24/the-
life-of-hispanic-immigrant-cleanup-workers-in-the-gulf/ (describing specifically 
the experience for Hispanic immigrant workers). Many Hispanic workers from 
South Florida were employed as cleanup workers to clean up the shorelines. See 
Fairness Hearing, supra note 1, at 241. 
 186  Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion to Retain at 2, Odom 
v. BP Am. Prod. Co., No. 16-CV-15974 (E.D. La. Mar. 1, 2017) [hereinafter 
Odom Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion to Retain]. 
 187  As of April 25, 2019, the docket contained 25,600 entries. In Re: Oil Spill 
by the Oil Rig "Deepwater Horizon" in the Gulf of Mexico, on April 20, 2010 
(2:10-md-02179), CT. LISTENER https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/4510515/ 
 
2019] A COURT’S CONTINUING OBLIGATION TO ENSURE FAIRNESS 1023 
facts of the Deepwater Horizon disaster, the subsequent spill, the 
cleanup efforts, and the terms of the MSA. 188  As one plaintiff 
pointed out in his filing, “[i]t is extremely unlikely that any other 
court in America is as knowledgeable or experienced [as the Eastern 
District of Louisiana] in handling the multitude of facts and legal 
issues which have been generated as a result of the BP Oil Spill.”189  
 Also, a jury in other states may not fully appreciate the scale of 
the Deepwater Horizon oil spill and of the ensuing cleanup opera-
tions, at least not as well as local jurors who either experienced the 
spill or have a better understanding of how the spill affected their 
communities. The fact that the MSA mandates qualifying BELO 
cases to be transferred away from the Gulf region under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1404(a), favors defendants. If BP was consistently tried in federal 
or state courts of the Gulf region, it is likely that the verdicts would 
be reflective of the local juries’ sense of fairness—results that any 
defendant in BP’s shoes would want to avoid. 
 Transferring the venue to outside the Gulf region may also create 
other problems for plaintiffs and their attorneys. Many, if not most, 
attorneys litigating BELO actions are located in the Gulf states.190 
Because these law firms are usually small and consist of a few at-
torneys who likely limit their practice to one or two states, these at-
torneys would need to become registered with each of the federal 
district courts in the states where the venue has been transferred.191 
Small plaintiff law firms—unlike the big law firms that BP retained 
to defend the BELO cases—have limited resources, both human and 
financial, to invest in litigating their clients’ cases in multiple juris-
dictions.192 
 The process of “just, speedy, and inexpensive” adjudication may 
                                                                                                                                        
in-re-oil-spill-by-the-oil-rig-deepwater-horizon-in-the-gulf-of-mexico/?filed_af-
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 188  Herd Telephone Interview, supra note 94. 
 189  Odom Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion to Retain, 
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 190  A web search of lawyers and law firms representing individuals in BELO 
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suffer when venue is transferred outside the Gulf region.193 Fortu-
nately, in cases where a claimant currently resides in a distant state 
but multiple other factors show his or her close contacts with the 
federal districts of Eastern Louisiana, Southern Mississippi, South-
ern Alabama, or Northern Florida, either the court or BP may be 
persuaded that the venue should not be transferred away from the 
Gulf region.194 For example, in an ongoing BELO case, plaintiff re-
sides in the Eastern District of Tennessee, but his injury and medical 
treatment took place in the Eastern District of Louisiana, and his 
expert witnesses also reside within the jurisdiction of the latter dis-
trict court.195 In this case, BP stipulated that the appropriate venue 
for the trial was the Eastern District of Louisiana.196  
 Not scattering the claims around different federal districts is also 
important because it gives plaintiffs’ attorneys an opportunity to 
consolidate claims consistent with where and when injuries oc-
curred.197 Consolidating cases would significantly lower litigation 
costs, for example, by requiring only one expert witness testimony 
instead of multiple testimonies by the same or multiple experts and 
by reducing the number of motions and pleadings, thus cutting down 
the workload for the attorneys.198 
 
 
                                                                                                                                        
 193  FED. R. CIV. P. 1. 
 194  See, e.g., Plaintiff’s BELO Complaint ¶ 6, Banegas v. BP Expl. & Prod., 
Inc., No. 17-7429 (E.D. La. Aug. 2, 2017) [hereinafter Banegas BELO Com-
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Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon,” MDL No. 2179 (E.D. La. Dec. 19, 2017) (“Requir-
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F. Claims Administrator’s Shortcomings  
Cannot Be Rectified Under the MSA 
 Claimants’ rights to compensation have been curbed by Garret-
son’s conduct in making it more difficult to file claims. Most im-
portantly, Garretson has regularly disregarded the deadlines that it 
is mandated to follow by the MSA.199 For example, under § V.E., 
Garretson is obligated to send the Notice of Defect within thirty days 
from the date of receipt of the Proof of Claim form,200 but Garretson 
does not follow this deadline.201 To take another example, under § 
V.J., Garretson has thirty days after receiving the last cured defect 
to issue final determination of what, if any, compensation is due;202 
however, Garretson also does not follow this deadline.203 Further, 
under § V.M., Garretson has fourteen days after receiving the review 
request to review the appeal,204 but, again, Garretson does not fol-
low the deadline.205 Finally, although the MSA requires Garretson 
to review the NOIS and transmit it to BP within ten days,206 Garret-
son has taken as long as seven months to process the NOIS.207 In 
one—not unusual—instance, Garretson took from September 3, 
2015 to May 2, 2016, to process plaintiff’s NOIS.208 
 Garretson’s disregard for deadlines has caused multiple prob-
lems for claimants and their attorneys. First, Garretson has unneces-
sarily prolonged the process of compensating claimants under SPC, 
and these claimants’ payments are not adjusted for the post-judg-
ment interest rate as are the damages that are awarded in a civil 
trial.209  Second, there are instances of claimants giving up their 
claims to higher compensation (for example deciding to take $1,300 
under A1 instead of pursuing $7,750 under A2) because they no 
                                                                                                                                        
 199  Downs Telephone Interview, supra note 54. 
 200  MSA, supra note 5, § V.E. 
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longer want—or can—wait for the money to cover their medical ex-
penses.210 Third, by not following the deadlines, Garretson makes it 
more difficult for plaintiffs’ attorneys to plan and organize their 
work because they never know when they should expect a response 
from Garretson.211 
 Garretson is also heavy-handed in examining claims, and, as 
some plaintiff attorneys say, it acts less as an impartial claims ad-
ministrator and more as an insurer or adjuster of BP’s interests.212 
For example, Garretson requires most claimants to remedy their 
SPC claims through an amendment or by sending additional docu-
ments.213 In one of its periodic status reports to the court, Garretson 
stated that the claims have been and continue to be “impacted by 
high defect rates”: seventy-eight percent (78%) of SPC claims sub-
mitted to Garretson have received either a “Request for Additional 
Information” or a “Notice of Defect.”214 Another fifty-three percent 
(53%) of SPC claims are voluntarily updated by the claimants.215 If 
Garretson, an experienced claims administrator that has handled 
over twenty class action settlements, claims that the defect rate of 
SPC claims is “high,” there is little reason to doubt its judgment.216 
 Also, Garretson is unforthcoming when it comes to the medical 
programs mandated by the MSA.217 Garretson releases limited in-
formation regarding the PMCP.218 This is because, as all evidence 
points to this conclusion, the program—despite being a part of the 
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MSA—is being implemented only partially.219 Garretson does not 
maintain a publically available list of medical providers with whom 
Garretson has “enter[ed] into a written contract . . . to provide med-
ical consultation visits.”220 Garretson only provides information on 
the implementation of the GRHOP, as the MSA mandates Garretson 
to provide to the parties reports on the program’s implementation.221  
 Despite systematic disregard for the deadlines, which has 
harmed plaintiffs’ right to be compensated, in practice, Garretson is 
immune from suffering any consequences of its conduct. Although 
the MSA states that the Eastern District of Louisiana “shall have 
ongoing and exclusive jurisdiction over the Claims Administrator,” 
it is unclear whether the Court may sanction Garretson as it is not a 
party to the case.222 Further, Garretson may only be removed by 
BP’s and plaintiffs’ joint motion.223 Because Garretson’s continued 
misconduct benefits BP (e.g. some claimants are giving up as the 
process of compensation is dragging on, memories of the spill are 
fading, and documents, such as medical proof, are getting lost), it is 
highly unlikely that the defendant would agree to remove Garretson 
as a claims administrator.224 
CONCLUSION 
 Under current Rule 23(e)(2), the class action settlement can only 
bind class members if the court approves the settlement after a fair-
ness hearing during which the judge assumes the position of the 
class fiduciary.225 In this Comment, I argued that the fiduciary duty 
of the court should continue even after the settlement’s approval. As 
I discussed in Part I, the relationship between the court and the par-
ties in class settlements governed by Rule 23(e)(2) is different than 
the relationship in non-class-action settlements. Further, in Parts II 
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and III, I showed how a seemingly uncomplicated and straightfor-
ward class action settlement that was praised by the legal commu-
nity and that promised just and swift compensation to class members 
turned into a prolonged nightmarish struggle for anybody wanting 
to receive more than the basic award of $1,300. Also, I showed a 
failing mechanism that is forcing a large group of claimants into 
second-phase Back-End Litigation Option and that is expected to 
clog many federal district courts in the Gulf Coast region with un-
necessary litigation. 
 The Deepwater Horizon MSA—which failed in its purpose of 
providing fair and swift compensation to class members—is an ex-
ample of why courts should have a continuing power to reassess the 
class action settlement when justice so requires. The MSA did not 
live up to its promises and, ironically, it fulfilled the catastrophic 
visions of the proponents of the MSA that not approving the settle-
ment would possibly lead to prolonged litigation as in the case of 
the 1989 Exxon Valdez oil spill.226 As Judge Barbier noted during 
the Fairness Hearing in 2012 “there is still litigation [of the Exxon 
Valdez case] going on . . . up in Alaska” and “that case was again 
before the United States Supreme Court on a legal issue of punitive 
damages . . . I do not plan to be here in 20 or 23 years handling this 
case.”227 Unfortunately, without the judicial power to reassess class 
action settlements, Judge Barbier may still be hearing Deepwater 
Horizon litigation years after the disaster.  
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